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The Impact of Affirmative Action on Employment
ABSTRACT
Affirmative action under Executive Order 11246 ranks
among the most controversial of domestic federal policies.
This study asks whether affirmative action has been successful
in promoting the employment of minorities and females. It
compares the change in demographics between 1974 and 1980
at more than sixty—eight thousand establishments, and finds
that both minority and female employment have increased faster
at establishments subject to affirmative action. Compliance







Berkeley, CA 94720I. introduction
Affirmative action, mandated by Executive Order 11246 in 1965, is one of the most
controversial government interventions in the labor market since abolition.1 While
much has been said concerning the propriety of affirmative action in theory, little is
known about the impact of affirmative action in practice. If affirmative action has not
changed the employment patterns of non-whites and females, then much of the dis-
cussion since 1965 of its philosophical merits amounts to shadow-boxing. The goal of
affirmative action is to increase employment opportunities for females and minorities.
1-las affirmative action been successful in achieving this goal? This paper will use a new
set of rich establishment level data to examine the effects of being a federal contrac-
tor subject to the affirmative action obligation, and of undergoing a compliance review,
on the employment of minorities and females.
The evidence to be presented in this paper indicates that affirmative action under
the contract compliance program has led to improved employment opportunities for
females and minorities. This result is based on a statistical comparison of the change
in demographics at more than sixty-eight thousand establishments with more than 16
million employees between 1974 and 1980. 1 shall argue that minorities' and females'
share of employment has increased more at establishments that are federal contrac-
tors, and so subject to affirmative action, than at non-contractors. Compliance
reviews, while questionably targeted, will be shown to have been an effective regula-
tory tool in increasing black and female employment. I shall also draw implications for
the relative wages of members of protected groups.
A model of affirmative action as a tax on the employment of white males is
presented in the following section. Section III presents cross-tabulations and log-odds
equations with multiple control variables comparing changes in the employment share
of detailed demographic groups across contractor and non-contractor establishments.
1-lave compliance reviews been a useful tool in the affirmative action effort? Many in-2-
private bun cr an r :acy groups argue that compliance reviews generatea lot
of paper, but fltti real change. To determine the efflcicy ofcompliance reviews this
section also compares changes in the representation of minorities and femalesacross
reviewed and non=reviewed contractor establishments.
A debate of major policy significance has beencontinuing between the view
represented by Heckman and Butler, and that found in the work of Freeman.concern-
ing the role played by the federal government in reducing racial economicinequality.
Section IV discusses the impact of affirmative action inreducing racial inequality in
earnings, followed by the conclusions of this research.
The findings to be presented here speak directly to thoseconcerned with the
position of minorities and females in our society, and with the role the federalgovern-
ment plays in improving their position. The single most certainaspect of affirmative
action is that it is controversial. This study brings new evidence tobear on that con-
troversy; evidence that can enlighten discussions both of discrimination in the United
States, and of the impact of government regulation.
Past Studies
Past studies of affirmative action are divided into tudies of theregulatory pro-
cess that find it mortally flawed, and studies of impact ftat find it successful. Thepro-
cess studies by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the General AccountingOffice, arid
the House and Senate Committees on Labor and Public Welfare allconclude that
affirmative action has been ineffective and blame weak enforcementand a reluctance
to apply sanctions. That this is not merely politics can bejudged from the fact that
the Department of Labor has been sued with some measure ofsuccess more than once
for failure to properly enforce affirmative action.2 Debarment, the ultimatesanction,
has been used only 26 times, with debarment of the first non-constructioncontractor
not occurring until 1974. The GAO and USCCR have found that otherforms of regula-
tory pressure such as pre-award reviews, delay of contract award, andwithholding of-3-
progress payments have not been forcefully and consistently pursued. However, as
evidenced by the increased incidence of debarment and backpay awards, enforcement
did become more aggressive after 1973.
In light of the unanimity of these process studies in finding the affirmative action
regulatory mechanism seriously deficient, it is surprising that the few past
econometric studies of the impact of affirmative action in its first years, by Burman,
Ashenfelter and Heckman, Goldstein and Smith, and Heckman and Wolpin, all based on
a comparison of EEO-1 forms by contractor status, have generally found significant
evidence that it has been effective for black males. While these few studies of the ini-
tial years of affirmative action between 1966 and 1973 are not directly comparable
because of differing specifications, samples, and periods, they do generally find that
despite weak enforcement in its early years, and despite the ineffectiveness of compli-
ance reviews, affirmative action was effective in increasing black male employment
share in the contractor sector, but generally ineffective for other protectedgroups.
This study will use a new set of highly disaggregated panel data to examine a more
mature affirmative action program between 1974 and 1980, after the beginning of sub-
stantial enforcement of regulations barring sex discrimination, after the start of
aggressive enforcement in the early seventies, and including the period after the
major reorganization of the contract compliance agencies into the OFCCP in 1978.
II. A Tax Model of Affirmative Action
This section develops a two sector general equilibrium tax model that underlies
most of the empirical work analyzing the effect of affirmative action. I model
affirmative action as a tax on the employment of white males in the contractor sector.
If these workers are immobile, they bear the tax burden and relative white male wages
fall.
Assume the owner of the firm maximizes utility:
MAXU = T(F(rn)—T(kV)m—T(WF)(1—m)—t(m--i)—d(1—m) (i)-4-
where
T total empkyrnerit
m =proportionof white males in T
=averageproportion of white males employed in
given industry and geographic area
=wageof white males
=wageof other workers
=taxon proportion male employment
d=tastefor discrimination against females and non-whites
F(.) =aproduction function with F>O,F"<O.
Now abstracting from the scale eflect by fixing T= 1, the first order condition is:
FW—W+t--d (2)
from which we find:
in =g(W,W,t,d) (3)
Taxes in this model of affirmative action are symmetrical with tastes for discrimi-
nation in Becker's model. Intuitively, an increase in the affirmative action tax' shifts
the demand curve for white male labor down.
I assume fixed tastes for discrimination and fixed technology, or less restrictively,
technological change that is neither male nor female saving. Under these conditions,
the change in demand is a function only of wages and the tax. The contractor firms
that are liable for the tax are distributed throughout the economy, so all firms are
assumed to be wage takers in the same labor market. I also assume that the wage
elasticity of labor demand is the same in the contractor and non-contractor sectors.
The difIerence between the change in the employment of males at contractor firms,
iflc, and at non-contractor firms, is then simply a function of affirmative action
pressure.-5-
—nwc = g(t) (4)
Thisis the central equation to be tested. I will compare shifts in the proportional
employment of members of protected groups across contractor and non-contractor
establishments across time. The hypothesis is that if affirmative action has been
ineffective, these employment shifts will be the same for contractors and non-
contractors. An effective affirmative action program is expected to shift the demand
curve for blacks in the contractor sector to the right, driving black wages up, increas-
ing black employment in the contractor sector and decreasing it in the non-
contractor sector. Tests of the employment effects are presented next, and thewage
effects are discussed in Section IV. One might also expect affirmative action to lead to
occupational upgrading, a possibility which is analyzed in other worb. In reality, there
are other policies, such as Title VII, promoting the employment of blacks in the non-
contractor sector, so I will only measure the differential impact of affirmative action
over and above the effects of general policies or changes in tastes.3
While this model has straightforward implications for changes in the employment
of males and females, one cannot fully explain changes in relative wages without con-
sidering supply shifts. A finding that affirmative action has been effective in increas-
ing female employment is consistent with an unchanging ratio of female to male wages
if female labor supply has increased at the same time. Since any such supply shift will
affect contractors and non-contractors alike, I isolate the impact of affirmative action
on labor demand by comparing changes in employment across contractors and non-
contractors.
In the above discussion I abstracted from scale effects, and as we shall see, these
are usually unimportant. However, scale effects may lead to a striking reversal of
changes in relative employment, obscuring the impact of affirmative action. The
analysis in this case is analogous to that in 2-sector general equilibrium models of tax-
ation or unionization. Consider the case in which the affirmative action tax is levied
on the employment of males only in the contractor sector, which is male intensive.-6-
Absent any scale effect, this leads to the substitution of females for males in the con-
tractor sector. At the same time though, this tax increases costs in the contractor
sector, depending upon the elasticity of substitution, and leads to a decline in the size
of the contractor sector, depending on product demand elasticities. As the contractor
sector shrinks it becomes even more male intensive, under the usual assumptions. If
this scale effect is large, we may observe an increase in the ratio of males to females
in both the contractor and non-contractor sectors because affirmative action has
been effective in taxing male employment. This is an important paradox to consider in
theory, but as we shall see, the differences in observed scale effects are in general
negligible, so we may draw inferences concerning the effect of affirmative action by
comparing what are in practice substitution eflects.4
Ill. The Impact of Affirmative Action on the Employment of Minorities and Females
The male share of employment has fallen steadily since 1960 as females have
flooded into the labor force. In 1974, .389 of the employed were female. By 1980 this
had increased by 7.2% to .417. While the proportion of non-white males in total
employment remained stable over this same period at .060, their proportion among
males rose by 5%, from .098 to .103. On their face, these growth rates in representa-
tion are not strikingly higher after 1970 than before. At the same time, both females
and non-white males share of unemployment has been growing, along with their
employment shares. The period between 1974 and 1980 witnessed growth in females'
share of employment, and in non-white males share of male employment. What part
has affirmative action played in these increases?
We have seen that affirmative action may usefully be thought of as a tax on the
employment of white males in the contractor sector, a tax that shifts the demand for
white male labor down. If affirmative action is effective, then the rate of change of
protected groups' employment share will be higher in contractor establishments than
in non-contractor establishments, ceteris paribus. Since affirmative action goals are-7-
similar within industry within region, the variance of employment share may be
expected to fall more and remain lower at contractor firms, controlling for industry
and region. In the long run, the levels of the employment shares of protected groups
will be higher in contractor firms, controlling for industry and region which deter-
mine skill requirements and local labor supply, and are not controlled for in the fol-
lowing cross-tabulations. The crucial tests are those on changes in levels of employ-
ment shares which difTerence out unchanging variables. Since stocks are only suscep-
tible to policy through changes in flows, I expect the flows, or in other words the
change in stocks to be a more sensitive indicator of the impact of policy. It should
also be noted that 1974 is an early year in the history of affirmative action, especially
for females. While affirmative action became etTective in 1965, the provisions pertain-
ing to females were a later addition, ñrst enforced about 1974. For both non-whites
and females, the adjustment process was by no means over by 1974.
Comparison of Mean Changes in Employment Shares in the Contractor and Non-
contractor Sectors
Table 1 shows that between 1974 and 1980 black and female employment shares
increased significantly faster in contractor establishments than in non-contractor
establishments. The appendix discusses the data on which the empirical tests dis-
cussed here are based. T-tests in Table 1 reject the equality of changes in means in
all cases except non-black minorities, which are the smallest group. There is no strik-
ing evidence in the changes in variances in representation over time, but the variance
in the contractor sector is always significantly less than in the non-contractor sector.
Contractor establishments start with proportionately more non-white males but fewer
females in 1974, which in itself casts doubt on the argument that female intensive
establishments are being selected as contractors. The most compelling evidence of
the impact of affirmative action in Table 1 is the significantly greoter increases in
female and black male employment shares in contractor establishments.5-8-
Theinterpretation of tests of affirmative action would be less straightforward
were scaleeffects todiffer greatly across sectors. However we see in Table 4.1 that
there is only a small difference in the growth rates of contractor and non-contractor
establishments; both are growing at between 2 to 3 percent per year, so differences in
scale effects across sectors are likely to be negligible. On net in these establishments
members of protected groups are, in part, being substituted for white males over time.
This also suggests that contractor firms are not gro*ing fat on government largesse,
allowing them to expand total employment to take on relatively unproductive minori-
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productivityof members of protected groups relative to that of white males did not
fall as their relative employment share increased.
Reviewed vs. Non-Reviewed
Given that contractor establishments have increased their employment of non-
whites and females more than non-contractor firms have, what administrative tools
have been useful? Do compliance reviews matter? One alternative is that the threat
of a compliance review is sufficient to obtain the desired behavior, so that reviewed
establishments do not differ significantly from non-reviewed contractor establish-
ments. This would be plausible if the threatened penalty if caught were severe enough
to outweigh the small probability of being caught. This is unlikely, because both the
probability of review and the penalties imposed are not great. The OFCCP has records
of at least 27,000 reviews completed between 1973 and 1981 at 11,000 different
identifiable establishments. In 1980, roughly 1 15,000 establishments were government
contractors, so at least ten percent of all contractor establishments had been
reviewed between 1973 and 1981, Twenty-six of these reviews resulted in the ultimate
penalty of debarment. Between 1969 and 1976, compliance reviews produced 331 con-
ciliation agreements according to a Department of Justice memorandum. These
agreements awarded S61,279,000 in back pay, or $185,133 per company in a heavily- 9.-
skewed distribution. Short of debarment or backpay awards, affirmativeaction
extracts only promises, though as we have seen, these promises are notempty.
Compliance reviews have been targeted at large establishments that already
employ proportionately more non-whites. The economics of targeting enforcement,
and detailed empirical tests of actual enforcement patterns are analyzed in other
work. Here I shall only note that while there are obvious advantages in terms of
economies of scale and signaling to reviewing large establishments first, thereseems
little to be gained in terms of reducing discrimination by enforcing affirmative action
primarily at establishments that already have the highest representation of non-
whites, conditional on size. Among the 41258 establishments that were contractors in
1974, the establishments that were reviewed between 1975 and 1979, inclusive,
employed an average of 745 workers in 1974, far more than the average of 239
employed by non-reviewed contractors. In addition, the employment share of non-
whites was 24 greater at reviewed contractors than at non-reviewed contractors in
1974, before review. This helps explain why we previously observed no decline in the
variance of representation among contractors. If one thought of thegrowth of non-
white representation as following a logistic growth curve, then squeezing furthergains
from establishments in the upper tail of the distribution would be difficult. If reviewed
contractors start out above the mean in protected group employment,compliance
reviews that prompt them to increase their employment of minorities furthermay
actually increase the variance in representation in the contractor sector.
Establishments that were reviewed expanded in size, though not significantly
more than the non-reviewed, Since the reviewed establishments were relatively non-
white intensive, the likely scale eect would work against an increase in non-white
employment share among the reviewed8.
The observed impact of compliance reviews should be interpreted in view of a
plausible simultaneity argument: the OFCCP tends to review those establishments with- 10-
thelowest growth rates of female and minority employment. This is indeed among the
things the OFCCP claims to do. If so, this simultaneity would bias against finding a
higher growth rate for female or minority representation among reviewed establish-
ments.
Multivariate Log-Odds Models
Do compliance reviews and contractor status have the same impact if other vari-
ables are controlled for? For example, the size of the establishment could be a crucial
variable. Large plants might tend to be good corporate citizens, or they may be more
likely to have formalized and rationalized personnel systems. Or simply by being large
they may escape the familial or tribal tendencies of small workforces. For any of
these reasons, one might expect larger firms to have better affirmative action records.
At the same time, one might expect contractor status to be positively correlated with
establishment size. In this case, the previous finding in cross-tabulations of a positive
relationship between contractor status and growth rates of female and minority
employment share might be spurious; it might be picking up the correlation between
protected group share and the omitted establishment size. Similar arguments of a
more tenuous nature may be made about industry and region.
In this section I present the results of log-odds equations that correct for estab-
lishment size, growth rate, corporate structure, percent non-clerical white-collar,
industry, region, and initial period demographics. The sample means of these control
variables, and the abbreviations by which they shall be referred in the following tables,
are indicated in Table 2. The interpretation of contractor etTects in this section
assumes that both contractor and non-contractor establishments are wage takers in
the same labor markets, and that both sectors have the same wage elasticity of
demand.
Table 3 presents the primary log-odds results, and shows a consistent pattern
across demographic groups. Establishments that were contractors in 1974I-,— i_i -
significantlyincreased the employment share of black males, other males, white
females and black females. According to Table 3, compliance reviews also played a
significant role in advancing black males, white females and black females, and in
retarding the employment of non-black males.
The estimate in equation 2 is that black males' share of employment increased .82
percentage points more in contractor establishments, not counting the direct effect, of
reviews. Since 6.3 percent of all contractor establishments accounting for 17.4 per-
cent of all contractor employment were reviewed in subsequent years, the additional
impact of compliance reviews is to increase black males share by .174 times 1.03, or
.16 percentage points. The total impact of the contract compliance program is then to
raise black males' share by one percentage point in the contractor sector over the six
years between 1974 and 1980. Dividing by six, yields a rough annual impact of .17.
This is about the geometric mean of previous estimates: a fourth of Heckman-Wolpin's
estimated .7 percentage point annual impact, but four times greater than Goldstein-
Smith's .036. This shift over six years is not small. It is equivalent to 14 percent of
black males' initial weighted employment share in the contractor sector, not an insub-
stantial demand shift.
These demand shifts, the central results of Table 3, are summarized in Table 4.
With the exception of the residual and smallest group, non-black minority females,
members of protected groups have enjoyed improved employment opportunities at
contractor establishments. This also holds true for white females in this log-odds
specification, although the effect is of marginal significance. In row 2, compliance
reviews appear to have been an effective tool in changing employment patterns. The
impact of compliance reviews is greater than the impact of simply being a federal con-
tractor in every case except non-black minority males. Direct pressure does make a
difference.
The evidence here is that a process that has been frequently criticized as largely- 12-
anexercise in paper-pushing has actually been of material importance in prompting
companies to increase their employment of minorities and females. The combined
impact of being a contractor, and of undergoing a review as in the case 17.4 percent
of all contractor employment, is presented in row 3. Row 5 displays the relative extent
of these contract compliance induced demand shifts by expressing them as a propor-
tion of initial 1974 employment shares in the contractor sector. The shift is largest
for blacks: fourteen percent for black males, and eleven percent for black females.
The proportionate shifts for white females and for non-black minority males are not as
large: two and flve percent respectively. It has been commonly speculated that
employers can kill two birds with one stone by hiring black females. The evidence
here is that while black females have gained relatively more under affirmative action
than white females, they have not gained more than black males, so that being black
appears more important than being female. Had black females been especially
favored, we would have expected their relative gains to be the greatest.7
To derive an estimate of the effect of affirmative action on market demands, I
assume that affirmative action has not directly altered labor demand schedules in the
non-contractor sector, I also maintain the assumptions that the demand elasticities
are equal in both sectors, and the supply curve identical, so that the differential
between employment shifts in the contractor and non-contractor sectors can be
identified as a demand shift. Since 68.6 percent of employment in the sample is in
contractor establishments, the market demand shift in row 6 is taken to be .685 times
the shift in the contractor sector. In other words, the market shift is simply the
weighted average of sectoral shifts. Because many small employers who are not con-
tractors are not included in the sample, this may well overestimate the shift in the
economy as a whole.
Employment opportunities depend critically on growth. Table 3 also indicates
that minorities and females experienced signht9cantly greater increases in representa-- 13-
tionin establishments that were growing and so had many job openings. For every
percentage point increase in the growth rate of establishment employment, white
males' employment share drops by about half a percentage point, suggesting that
members of protected groups dominate the net incoming flows. Establishment size
has only a small impact, but establishments that are not part of multi-plant corpora-
tions have significantly lower growth rates of employment for members of protected
groups.8 Corporate size matters rather than establishment size, with larger corpora-
tions showing greater increases in minority and female employment. It is also impor-
tant to note that the tests here also control for the skill requirements of each estab-
lishment. Establishments that are non-clerical white-collar intensive exhibit faster
employment growth for members of all protected groups except black males.
There is significant variation in the growth of minority and female representation
across industries and regions. To determine the within industry within region impact
of affirmative action, all of the equations in Table 3 include 27 industry and 4 region
dummy variables. The omitted groups were retail trade and New England. Some of
these variables had significant and strong effects. White males' employment share, a
summary measure, is significantly five or more percentage points higher in mining,
construction, lumber, stone clay and glass, and transportation. It is five or more per-
centage points lower in apparel. Mirroring this, white females' share is significantly 5
or more percentage points lower in agriculture, mining, construction, stone clay and
glass, primary metals, petroleuni and coal products, and transportation, and five or
more higher in apparel and furniture. Black males' share is significantly at least 2
percentage points lower in agriculture, mining, apparel, lumber, leather, and electrical
machinery. Since initial 1974 employment share, region, growth rate, and percent
non-clerical white-collar are controlled for, these appear to reflect real differences
across sectors in the growth of minority and female employment. Across regions,
blacks increase their employment share significantly more in the South, although F-- 14-
testsdo not reject the equality of coefficients on contractor and review status in the
South and nationally.
Changes in Contractor Status
The impact of establishments which change contractor status between 1974 and
1980 is explored in Table 5. In the case of black males, the coefficients lineup in the
expected order of magnitude. Black males experienced the greatest employment
gains at establishments that remained contractors, followed in order by establish-
ments that left contractor status, those that became contractors, and finally, those
that never were contractors. For all protected groups, employment gains, ifany, were
smaller at establishments that were not contractors in 1974 and 1980 than in estab-
lishments that were contractors in cithcr or both years. Except for white females,
establishments which left contractor status demonstrate better employment records
for members of protected groups than do establishments that just became contrac-
tors. This is consistent with state dependence based on the inertia of employment
stocks and personnel policies9. Before leaving Table 5, note that while the status
change variables are usually individually significant, they do not generally contribute
to a significant reduction in the standard error of the estimate.
The statistical tests shown in this section give evidence of a contractcompliance
program that works. Executive Order 11246 has led to significant employment gains
for females and for blacks in contractor establishments, and compliance reviews have
played an important role in this process.
Selection or Changed Behavior?
It is not implausible to suppose, along the lines of Heckman and Wolpin, that those
establishments with a relative overabundance of white males would avoidbeing federal
contractors. Some of the findings presented above might be qualified if therewere
evidence of such selection: if establishments with high protectedgroup employment- 15-
weremore likely to be contractors. Because of the recursive nature of the system,
this proposition is tested in Table 5 in logit estimates of the probability of being a con-
tractor in 1980 as a function of 1974 demographics, the change in demographics
between 1974 and 1980, and establishment size, growth rate, corporate status, indus-
try and region. There is little evidence here to support the proposition that. establish-
ments with a high or growing level of minority or female employment are more likely
to be contractors. This leads one to speculate that perhaps the costs of affirmative
action are not great on average, or that they are balanced by lump-sum transfers
from the government in a contracting process that does not turn on price alone.
The evidence in Table 6 suggests that the establishments that were more likely to
be contractors in 1980 were actually those with the greatest proportion of white males
and the least proportion of minorities and females in 1974, just the opposite of what
one selection argument would suggest. Similar results are found when contractor
status in 1974 is controlled for in linear probability equations. These eflects are
significant, with the exception of black males, who have no significant impact one way
or the other on contractor status at the .05 confidence level. Since the share vari-
ables must sum to one, the smallest group, non-black minority females, is omitted.
Controlling for initial period demographics, Table 6 also suggests that establishments
with the greatest increases in minority or female employment share were not
significantly more likely to be contractors in 198010. Affirmative action appears to
work not by the selection of firms with good records of protected group employment
into contractor status, but rather by inducing contractors to employ more minorities
and females.
W. The IrripactonRacial Earnings Inequality
Those who have argued about the propriety of affirmative action have not been
quibbling over a fine point. The federal contract compliance program has substan-
tially improved employment opportunities for members of protected groups. The- 16-
growthrates of females' and minorities' shares of employment are greater in contrac-
tor establishments obligated to undertake affirmative action than in non-contractor
establishments with no such obligation. Compliance reviews, the major enforcement
tool of the affirmative action program, while poorly targeted against discrimination,
have contributed significantly to improving the employment of members of protected
groups.
The scale of the demand shifts due to affirmative action found in thispaper is not
small, but this can best be appreciated by comparing them to relative wage changes
during the same period. Between 1974 and 1980, the black male to white male ratio of
the mean earnings of full-time, full-year workers increased by 2.3 percent from .684 to
.700.11 What part of this improvement in relative black male earningsmay be
explained by affirmative action?
To frame the implications of the demand shifts found here for the change in black
male relative earnings, consider the following simple model of the labor market, where




ND is the logarithm of the demand for black male labor relative to white male labor.
Ns is the logarithm of relative labor supply.
W is the logarithm of the ratio of black to white male wages.
In equilibrium:
(a)





InTable 3 1 estimated that the relative demand for black male to white male work-- 17-
ersincreased by 14.8 percent in the contractor sector between 1974 and 1980. Main-
taining the assumption that affirmative action has not directly shifted demand curves
outside the contractor sector, and assuming that roughly half of all employment is in
the contractor sector, the implied relative demand shift overall is 7.4 percent. For
demand and supply elasticities that sum to less than six, at least half of the improve-
ment in black relative earnings among men may be explained by affirmative action.
Since the actual percentage increases in the ratio of median earnings, or in the mean
or median earnings of all workers were all less than 2.3 percent, affirmative action may
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ofsupply or demand. While it is not implausible to think of the elasticity of relative
labor demand being greater than one, in other work I estimate this elasticity of substi-
tution of non-white for white male labor to be on the order of of .7 i.e 1.1. While other
factors on both the demand and the supply side of these markets have likely also
played a role, the increase in the demand for black male labor relative to white
induced by affirmative action can help account for a significant part of of the increase
in the relative earnings of black males.12
V. Conclusion
The tests presented here suggest that while generating tremendous public criti-
cism and resistance and while undergoing frequent regulatory reorganization,
affirmative action has actually been successful in promoting the employment of minor-
ities and females, though less so in the case of white females. In the contractor sector
affirmative action has increased the demand relative to white males of black males by
14.8%, of non-black nunority males by 6.3%, and of white females by 2.9%. Among
females, it has increased the demand for blacks relative to whites by 9.0%. For a pro-
gram lacking public consensus and vigorous enforcement, this is a surprisingly strong
showing. While the gains of white females are smaller than those of blacks, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the employment of females and minorities has been- 18-
increasingin both sectors. Indeed, if the OFCCP pressured establishments to hire
more females and minorities compared to their own past record rather than compared
to industry arid region averages, the observed pattern is just whatwe would expect to
see during a period when female labor supply had been growing. Females' share would
increase at all establishments due to the supply shift, and contractor establishments
would be under little pressure to employ more females than non-contractors. The
relatively shorter history of affirmative action for females, as well as the demographic
composition of the bureaucracies that enforce affirmative action,may also help
explaiu the diflerential impact of afflrmative action across protectedgroups.
This paper has presented significant large sample evidence with detailedcontrols
at the establishment level that minority and female employment has increasedfaster
at. contractor establishments that. bear the affirmative actionobligation. 11 has also
shown that compliance reviews have not been well targetedagainst discrimination, but
have been an efTective enforcement tool. In sum, amidstvigorous contention and weak
enforcement, affirmative action appears to have played a major role inimproving the
economic position of minorities and females.- 19-
Appendix:Data
Two rich, detailed, and disaggregated data sets are used in theempirical tests:
establishment level EEO-1 reports on more than sixteen million employees for 1974
and 1980, and establishment level affirmative action compliance reviewreports for the
period 1973 to 1981. Access to this data was made possible by the Office of the Assis-
tant Secretary for Policy Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Labor andby the
OFCCP's Division of Program Analysis.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal EmploymentOpportunity
Commission requires annual reports on workforce demographics from allprivate
employers with 100 or more employees, or 50 or more employers and a federal con-
tract or first-tier subcontract worth $50,000 or more. In the case ofmulti-plant
employers, all establishments with more than 24 employees that belong to firms
fulfilling the above conditions must report individually. In 1978, 39,000 employers with
more than 165,000 establishments filed reports covering 36 million employees, more
than half of all private non-farm employees. The EEO sample is extensive,covering
three-quarters of all manufacturing emp]oyment as reported by the B.L.S. Employers
with small workforce establishments such as construction, trade andagriculture are
underrepresented. Construction and agriculture are also underrepresented because
temporary or casual employees are not counted as employees for thepurposes of
reporting requirements [EEOC Report 1978, p.xi].
Firms may have an incentive to discover that their white male employeesare
really minority females when it comes to filling out their EEO-1 forms. This need raise
no problem for the current study if such "inflation" is uniform across sectors as is
likely if liability to Title VII litigation is perceived as the primary threat. Under Title
VII pressure moreover, firms will be more concerned with inflating minority and female
employment levels than growth rates. However, if this lying does extend subtly to
growth rates, then to the extent that such behavior is greater among contractor- 20-
establishments,all studies including the one at hand, that rely on comparisons of con-
tractor and non-contractor EEO-1 forms will overestimate the true impact of
affirmative action.
From samples of roughly 160,000 establishments in 1980 and 100000 establish-
ments in 1974 1 found 68,690 establishments that filed identifiable reports in both
years. The empirical tests comparing contractors wit,h non-contractors are based on
these 68,690 establishments with more than sixteen million employees from the
matched sample.
An establishment is considered a contractor if the company or any of its estab-
lishments are prime government contractors or first-tier subcontractors with a con-
tract, subcontract or purchase order of $50000 or more. This study identifies any
such establishment as a contractor, whether or not the establishment so identified
itself. Note that the sub-contractor clause vastly extends the compass of affirmative
action regulation. To the extent that I label as contractors some establishments that
are riot aware that they are under the affirmative action obligation, I mix the sin of
ignorance together with the greater sin of willful volition. if affirmative action were
found to be ineffective, it would be useful to separate these two causes.
Contractor status changers, particularly entrants, between 1974 and 1980 are
surprisingly common. Eleven percent of all 1974 contractors establishments were
non-contractors in 1980, while twenty-seven percent of all 1974 non-contractors were
identified as contractors in 1980, constituting seventeen percent of all 1980 contrac-
tors. This suggests contractors have become better labeled over time. Whether these
status changes are true, or just an artifact of more accurate reporting, my results will
be biased against finding any affirmative action effect when I test according to 1974
status only. In other words, I underestimate the effect of being a contractor because I
include among the non-contractors some establishments that became or really were
contractors, and I include among the contractors some establishments that became or- 21-
reallywere non-contractors.
•To compare demographic changes across reviewed and non-reviewed establish-
ments I merged the matched 1974 and 1980 EEQ-1 establishment demographic data
with data on OF'CCP compliance reviews. OFCCP administrative records contain data
on 27,000 compliance reviews at 11,000 identifiable establishments, between 1973 and
1981. Before 1978, I have data almost exclusively on reviews conducted by the Depart-
ment of Defense, but these accounted for nearly half of all compliance reviews.
Reviews completed prior to 1973 or after 1979 are underrepresented, and due to gen-
eral under-reporting some estabiishrnent that were reviewed will be included among
the non-reviewed, biasing my tests against finding an impact of compliance reviews. I
labeled as reviewed any establishments that had a record of at least one compliance
review between 1975 and 1979 inclusive. Multiple reviews are riot rare, but are not
controlled for in my tests. Since I expect decreasing returns to multiple reviews, this
will bias against finding any review efiect in the case of establishments reviewed prior
to 1974. In other cases I will simply be measuring the cumulative eecL of reviews.
Since the mode year of review completion in the sample is 1975, while demographic
changes are measured between 1974 and 1980, there is little potential for underes-
timating review efrects due to lags in response.- 22-
NOTES
Affirmative action in this study refers narrowly to the obligation borneby federal
contractors under Executive Order 11246, and not to other forms ofvoluntary of
court ordered affirmative action.
2.See for example the cases of Legal Aid Society of AlamedaCounty v. Brennan,
Women's Equity Action League v. Departnient of Labor, andWashington Area Con-
struction industry Task Force v. Marshall.
3.Throughout this study, one of the chief concerns is what the labor market for
minorities and females would have been in the absence of Executive Order11246.
A distinct question is: what would happen in the future if affirmativeaction were
abolished? The tax models of regulation just presentedare suitable for the first
question, but pre-judge the answer to the second. in the absence of theregula-
tory tax the model assumes the demand for minorities and females willresume its
former level. A more complex model along the lines ofAigner and Cain is needed,
that allows for learning and changes in discriminatory behavior.Afterall, one of
the goals of affirmative action is to break downprejudice. If employers have
falsely pre-judged minorities and women to be less capable than whitemales, a
temporary affirmative action program might have permanent effects byshocking
them into correcting their mistake faster.
4.The contractor and review effects here areunlikely to really be due to an omitted
Title VII variable. Across state by 2-digit SICindustry cells, the correlation of Tile
VII class action cases decided in the federal district courtsand contractor
employment is only .19. Of course, this is not to detract from theimportant role
played by Title VII in the development and enforcement of affirmativeaction. The
direct effect of Title VII is the subject of other work.
5.Table 1 shows that affirmative action has been effective atthe average establish-
ment, not for the average worker. To draw inferencesregarding wages, changes- 23-
inemployment share must be weighted by establishment size. This comparison
shows smaller differences between sectors, suggesting that affirmative action has
produced greater changes at smaller establishments.
6.It is also interesting to note that contractor establishments that were reviewed at
all underwent an average of 1.8 reviews between 1975 and 1979 inclusive, and that
these reviewed contractors were more likely to maintain contractor status than
were the non-reviewed contractors. Only 3.4 percent of the reviewed contractors
were no longer contractors by 1980. In contrast, 11.8% of the non-reviewed con-
tractors ceased being contractors. While not controlling for other variables, this
comparison does not in itself suggest that the compliance review process is so
burdensome as to lead firms to eschew federal contracts.
7.Other regressions show some evidence that affirmative action for black males has
been more effective at male intensive establishments. Weighting by establishment
size does not significantly alter the major conclusions presented here.
8.At the same time other tests do show evidence of a tradeoff between the employ-
ment growth of females and minority males.
9.Except for black males, the impact of affirmative action actually appears to have
been greater at establishments that ceased being contractors than at those that
remained contractors. If some establishments found the cost of complying with
affirmative action exorbitant, one might well expect them to giveup being con-
tractors before incurring the cost.. In this sense, the pattern observed in these
cases is anomalous. Similarly, unless screening of new contractors has become
more stringent, it is not obvious why new entrants should have better records of
employing white females and of not employing white males than contractors of
long-standing. If these establishments are becoming contractors because they
find it easy to comply with affirmative action, as one self-selection argument goes,
why didn't they choose to reap the benefits of being a federal contractor six- 24-
yearssooner?
10. However, one would have expected some of thesecoefficients to be positive, and
the coefficient on white males is also negative. While itis possible to interpret
these estimates to say that conditional on 1974demographics, establishments in
which white male employment share increased at theexpense of black males were
slightly more likely to be contractors, this small effect isstatistically insignificant.
In general, there is no significant evidence here thatestablishments with a large
or growing proportion of minority or female employeesare more likely to be con-
tractors. In this regard, it is worth recalling that thePeckman-Wolpin estimates
imply that individually the level or growth of black maleemployment share had an
insignificant effect on the probability of being a federalcontractor, and that
establishments with high or growing female or non-blackminority employment
shares were actually less likely to be contractors,though insignificantly so [Heck-
man and Wolpin, Table 7, p. 562].
11. Earnings of full-time workers employed 50-52 weeksfrom U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, "Money Incomein 1974 of Fami-
lies and Persons in the U.S.", no. 101, January,1976 Tab]e6], p.127. and from
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,Series P-60, "Money
Income in 1974 of Households, Families, and Persons in theU.S.", no. 132, July,
1982, Table 59, p.2l3,214.
12. For a discussion of these issues see Brown, and Butler and Ijeckmari- 25-
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Table1: Proportion of all Employees
Demographic Contractor 1974 1980
Line GroupStatus Number Mean a Mean a MeanL Mean%t
1Black N27432.053.10 .059 .10 .00628
2 Males Y41258.058.10 .067 .10 .00833
3 (6.0) (9.4) (6.5)(3.6)
4 Other N .034 .10 .046.10 .01252
5 Minority Y .035.08 .048 .09 .01358
6 Males (1.6) (2.1) (1.2)(2.1)
7 White N .448.27 .413.26 —.034 —2
8 Males Y .584.26 .533.25 —.047 —4
9 (66.7) (66.5) (16.4) (2.0)
10Black N .047.10 .059.11 .01247
11 Females Y .030.07 .045.08 .015 77
12 (24.0) (19.2) (5.7)(10.8)
13Other N .024.08 .036.08 .012 65
14 Minority Y .016.05 .028.06 .012 77
15Females (14.8) (13.0) (1.1)(3.2)
16 White N .394.27 .400.26 .00617
17 Females Y .276.23 .288.23 .012 30
18 (59.7) (57.8) (7.8)(11.9)
19 Total N 186 286 209341 23 17
20 Y 271728 276720 5 21
21 (21.2) (16.2) (10.7) (3.3)
Ncte:T-Tests across means in parentheses, on every third line. In
every case, F-tests reject. equality of variances across contractors and
non-contractors, with more than 99i confidence. The last column is
the mean of percentage changes, not the percentage of change in
means.
N =non-contractorin 1974.
Y contractor in 1974.- 28-




C74 .601 .49 =1if establishment was part of a
contractor company in 1974
STAYC .533 .50 =1if establishment was part of a
contractor company in 1974 and in 1980
LEAVEC.068 .25 =1if establishment was part of a
contractor company in 1974 but not
in 1980.
ENTERC.109 .31 =1if establishment was part of a
contractor company in 1980 but not
in 1974.
R .041 .20 =1if establishment completed a
compliance review between 1974 and
1980 exclusive.
SIZE 237 594 Total number of employees in 1974.
GROWTH.197 1.67 Rate of growth of total employment
from 1974 to 1980.
SINGLE .183 .39 =1if establishment was not part of
a multi-establishment company.
PWC .381 .31 Proportion of all employees who are
officials, managers, professionals,
technicians and sales people.- 29-
Table3: Log-Odds Equations of the Effect of Contractor and Review
Status on Employment by Demographic Group.
N =68690
Demographic White Black Other White Black
Group Males Males Males Females Females
Equation: 1 2 3 4 5
C74 —.300 .816 .207 .242 .310
—.012 .136 .046 .011 .062
(.005) (.009) (.009) (.006) (.009)
R —1.43 1.03 —.234 1.34 .660
—.057 .171 —.052 .061 .132
(.012) (.021) (.022) (.015) (.021)
P74* 115 56.5 46.0 110.0 53.8
4.60 9.41 10.21 4.92 10.76
(.010) (.042) (.050) (.013) (.050)
SIZE .0002 .0002 —.00063 —.0026 —.00027
.000008 .000033 —.000 14 —.000 12 —.00043
(.000004) (.000007)(.000007) (.000005) (.000007)
GROWTH —.475 .138 .117 .163 .130
—.019 .023 .026 .007 .026
(.ooi) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.0023)
SINGLE .050 —1.27 —.851 —.792 —1.53
.002 —.212 —.189 —.036 —.305
(.007) (.012) (.012) (.008) (.012)
PWC —4.43 —.324 .887 10.41 .66
—.177 —.054 .197 .471 .131
(.009) (.016) (.0017) (.011) (.016)
R2 .837 .545 .519 .796 .536
MSE .343 .992 1.116 .485 1.017
Nate: The first line is 100(dP/dX) evaluated at mean P. The second is the
coefficient from the log-odds equation. The third is the standard error. All
equations include 27 industry and 4 region dummies.- 30-
Table4: Demand Shifts Induced by the Contract Compliance Pro-




















Note: The contractor and
in proportion as estimated in
mean. The initial shares are
weighted by establishment size,
means in the contractor sector.
ed in rows 1 and 2 only.
*= Significantat the .05 level.

















reviewer effects are the change
Table 3 evaluated at the sample
means across establishments
or, in other words, the ratio of




Table5: Log-Odds Equations of the Effect of Contractor and Review
Status on Employment by Demographic Group. Status
Changers.
N =68690
Demographic White Black Other White Black
Group: Males Males Males Females Females
Equation: 1 2— 3 4 — 5
STAYC —.375 .876 .230 .506 .240
—.015 .148 .051 .023 .048
(.006) (.010) (.011) (.007) (.010)
LEAVEC —1.025 .786 .333 .748 .825
—.041 .131 .074 .034 .165
(.010) (.017) (.018) (.012) (.017)
ENTERC —.575 .150 .113 .968 .050
—.023 .025 .025 .044 .010
(.008) (.014) (.015) (.010) (.014)
R —1.45 1.02 —.230 134 .700
—.058 .169 —.051 .061 .140
(.012) (.021) (.022) (.015) (.021)
P74 115 56.5 46.0 110.0 53.8
4.60 9.41 10.21 4.92 10.74
(.010) (.042) (.050) (.013) (.050)
SIZE .0002 .0002 —.00063 —.00026 .00027
.000008 .000032 —.000 14 —.0000 12 .000042
(.000004) (.000007) (.000007) (.000005) (.0000007)
GROWTH —.475 .138 .117 .163 .130
—.019 .023 .026 .0074 .026
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.00016) (.0023)
SINGLE .002 —1.25 —.837 —.682 —1.55
.0001 —.208 —.186 —.031 —.309
(.007) (.012) (.012) (.008) (.012)
PWC 4.43 —.336 .887 10.36 .69
—.177 —.056 .197 .471 .137
(.009) (.016) (.0017) (.011) (.015)
R2 .837 .545 .519 .796 .536
MSE .343 .992 1.116 .485 1.016
Note: The lrst line is 100(dP/dX) evaluated at mean P. The second is the
coefficient from the log-odds equation. The third is the standard error. All
equations include 27 industry and 4 region dummies.- 32-
Table6: Logit Estimates of Simultaneity: the Effect of Estab-





1974 .079 .344 .13
Proportion Black Male,
1974 —.032 —.138 .15
Proportion Non-Black Male,
1974 —.086 —.376 .18
Proportion White Female,
1974 —.205 —.891 .13
Proportion Black Female,
1974 —.200 —.871 .17
Proportion White Male,
1980-1974 —.552 —2.40 .18
Proportion Black Male,
1980-1974 —.543 —2.36 .23
Proportion Non-Black Minority,
1980-1974 —.727 —3.16 .25 iProportionWhite Female,
1980-1974 —.499 —2.17 .17
iProportion Black Female,
1980-1974 —.511 —2.22 .23
SIZE .0011 .0047 .0043
GROWTH —.453 —1.97 .021
SINGLE .00009 .00039 .00013
27 Industry and
4 Region Dummies Yes
MSE .189
Mean of Dependent Variable .641